1.
Russell, B. The problems of philosophy. (Oxford University Press, 1998).
2.
van Inwagen, Peter. Metaphysics. https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/metaphysics/.
3.
Steup, Matthias. Epistemology. https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/epistemology/.
4.
DeRose, K. & Warfield, T. A. Skepticism: A Contemporary Reader. (Oxford University Press, 1999).
5.
Steup, Matthias, Turri, John, Sosa, Ernest. Jonathan Vogel, The Refutation of Skepticism, in Contemporary Debates in Epistemology, pp. 108-119. (Wiley-Blackwell, 2013).
6.
Lemos, N. M. An introduction to the theory of knowledge. vol. Cambridge introductions to philosophy (Cambridge University Press, 2007).
7.
Brueckner, A. The Structure of the Skeptical Argument. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 54, (1994).
8.
Klein, Peter. Skepticism. https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/skepticism/.
9.
Greco, J. External World Skepticism. Philosophy Compass 2, 625–649 (2007).
10.
Bryan Frances. When a Skeptical Hypothesis Is Live. Noûs 39, 559–595 (2005).
11.
Descartes, R. & Moriarty, M. Meditations on first philosophy: with selections from the Objections and replies. vol. Oxford world’s classics (Oxford University Press, 2008).
12.
Jonathan Vogel. Cartesian Skepticism and Inference to the Best Explanation. The Journal of Philosophy 87, 658–666 (1990).
13.
Hickey, L. Brain in a Vat Argument. http://www.iep.utm.edu/brainvat/.
14.
Brueckner, A. L. Brains in a Vat. The Journal of Philosophy 83, (1986).
15.
Brueckner, A. & Oxford University Press. Essays on skepticism. (Oxford University Press, 2010).
16.
Cunning, D. The Cambridge Companion to Descartes’ Meditations. vol. Cambridge companions to philosophy (Cambridge University Press, 2014).
17.
Wright, C. On Putman’s Proof that we are not Brains-in-a-Vat. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 92, (1992).
18.
Rosen, G. A. Alex Byrne, ‘Skepticism about the Internal World’, in The Norton Introduction to Philosophy, pp. 282-290. (W.W. Norton, 2015).
19.
Rosen, G. A. Gilbert Ryle, ‘Self-Knowledge’, in The Norton Introduction to Philosophy, pp. 274-282. (W.W. Norton, 2015).
20.
Rosen, G. A. David M. Armstrong, ‘Introspection’, in The Norton Introduction to Philosophy, pp. 265-273. (W.W. Norton, 2015).
21.
Gertler, Brie. Self-Knowledge. https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/self-knowledge/.
22.
A Treatise of Human Nature, by David Hume.
23.
Vickers, John. The Problem of Induction. https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/induction-problem/.
24.
Rosen, G. A. Peter Strawson, ‘The “Justification” of Induction’, in The Norton Introduction to Philosophy, pp. 151-159. (W.W. Norton, 2015).
25.
Harman, G. H. The Inference to the Best Explanation. The Philosophical Review 74, (1965).
26.
Gettier, E. L. Is Justified True Belief Knowledge? Analysis 23, (1963).
27.
Lemos, N. M. An introduction to the theory of knowledge. vol. Cambridge introductions to philosophy (Cambridge University Press, 2007).
28.
Rosen, G. A. Timothy Williamson, ‘Knowledge and Belief’ in The Norton Introduction to Philosophy, pp. 124-130. (W.W. Norton, 2015).
29.
Zagzebski, L. The Inescapability of Gettier Problems. The Philosophical Quarterly 44, (1994).
30.
Ichikawa, Jonathan Jenkins. The Analysis of Knowledge. https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/knowledge-analysis/.
31.
Greco, J. & Sosa, E. Linda Zagzebski ‘What is Knowledge?’, in The Blackwell Guide to Epistemology, pp. 92-116. vol. Blackwell philosophy guides (Blackwell Publishers, 1999).
32.
Armstrong, D. M. Belief, Truth and Knowledge. (Cambridge University Press, 1973).
33.
Crane, T. The Problem of Perception (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy/Winter 2014 Edition). http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2014/entries/perception-problem/.
34.
Strawson, P. F. Perception and its Objects. in Philosophical writings 125–145 (Oxford University Press, 2011). doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199587292.003.0011.
35.
Lowe, E. J. An introduction to the philosophy of mind. (Cambridge University Press, 2000).
36.
Siegel, S. Direct Realism and Perceptual Consciousness. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73, 378–410 (2006).
37.
Berkeley, G., Robinson, H. & Berkeley, G. Principles of human knowledge: and, Three dialogues. vol. Oxford world’s classics (Oxford University Press, 1999).
38.
Fogelin, R. J. Routledge Philosophy Guidebook to Berkeley and the Principles of Human Knowledge. vol. Routledge philosophy guidebooks (Routledge, 2001).
39.
Soteriou, Matthew. The Disjunctive Theory of Perception. https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/perception-disjunctive/.
40.
Lowe, E. J. Indirect Perception and Sense Data. The Philosophical Quarterly 31, (1981).
41.
Logue, H. Why naive realism? Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society (Hardback) 112, 211–237 (2012).
42.
Lowe, E. J. An introduction to the philosophy of mind. (Cambridge University Press, 2000).
43.
Martin, M. G. F. The Limits of Self-Awareness. Philosophical Studies 120, 37–89 (2004).
44.
Fish, William. Philosophy of Perception.
45.
Dancy, J. Arguments From Illusion. The Philosophical Quarterly 45, (1995).
46.
Shoemaker, S. Qualities and Qualia: What’s in the Mind? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 50, (1990).
47.
Martin, M. G. F. The Transparency of Experience. Mind and Language 17, 376–425 (2002).
48.
Rosen, G. A. Michael Tye, ‘The Puzzle of Transparency’, in The Norton Introduction to Philosophy, pp. 439-447. (W.W. Norton, 2015).
49.
Nagel, J. Epistemic Intuitions. Philosophy Compass 2, 792–819 (2007).
50.
Lowe, E. J. & MyiLibrary. The Routledge Guidebook to Locke’s Essay Concerning Human Understanding. vol. Routledge guides to the great books (Routledge, 2013).
51.
Rosen, G. A. David Hume, ‘Of the Idea of Necessary Connection’, in The Norton Introduction to Philosophy, pp. 197-204. (W.W. Norton, 2015).
52.
Carroll, J. W. & Markosian, N. Chapter 2, in An Introduction to Metaphysics. (Cambridge University Press, 2010).
53.
Rosen, G. A. John S. Mill, ‘The Method of Difference’, in The Norton Introduction to Philosophy, pp. 215-222. (W.W. Norton, 2015).
54.
Rosen, G. A. Ned Hall, ‘Causation and Correlation’, in The Norton Introduction to Philosophy, pp. 223-234. (W.W. Norton, 2015).
55.
Hume, David, Millican, Peter. Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding. (OUP Oxford, 2007).
56.
Rosen, G. A. David Hume, from ‘An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding’, Sections IV-V, in The Norton Introduction to Philosophy, pp. 141-149. (W.W. Norton, 2015).
57.
Rosen, G. A. David Hume, ‘Of Skepticism with Regard to the Senses’, in The Norton Introduction to Philosophy, pp. 302-312. (W.W. Norton, 2015).
58.
Thomasson, A. L. The Controversy over the Existence of Ordinary Objects. Philosophy Compass 5, 591–601 (2010).
59.
Carroll, J. W. & Markosian, N. Chapters 8 and 9, in An Introduction to Metaphysics. (Cambridge University Press, 2010).
60.
Loux, M. J. & Zimmerman, D. W. Chapter 5, Peter van Inwagen, ‘Existence, Ontological Committment, and Fictional Entities’, in The Oxford Handbook of Metaphysics. (Oxford University Press, 2003).
61.
Maurin, A.-S. Bradley’s Regress. Philosophy Compass 7, 794–807 (2012).
62.
Alex Oliver. The Metaphysics of Properties. Mind 105, 1–80 (1996).
63.
Max Black. The Identity of Indiscernibles. Mind 61, 153–164 (1952).
64.
Rosen, G. A. John Locke, ‘Some Further Considerations Concerning Our Simple Ideas’, in The Norton Introduction to Philosophy, pp. 457-464. (W.W. Norton, 2015).
65.
Lowe, E. J. & MyiLibrary. Chapter 3, ‘Perception’, in The Routledge Guidebook to Locke’s Essay Concerning Human Understanding, pp. 34-65. vol. Routledge guides to the great books (Routledge, 2013).
66.
Smith, A. D. Of Primary and Secondary Qualities. The Philosophical Review 99, (1990).
67.
Paul A. Boghossian and J. David Velleman. Colour as a Secondary Quality. Mind 98, 81–103 (1989).
68.
Rosen, G. A. David M. Armstrong, ‘The Secondary Qualities’, in The Norton Introduction to Philosophy, pp. 466-474. (W.W. Norton, 2015).
69.
Martha Brandt Bolton. The Origins of Locke’s Doctrine of Primary and Secondary Qualities. The Philosophical Quarterly 26, 305–316 (1976).
70.
Rosen, G. A. Colin McGinn, ‘Secondary Qualities’, in The Norton Introduction to Philosophy, pp. 483-490. (W.W. Norton, 2015).
71.
Locke, J. & Winkler, K. An Essay Concerning Human Understanding: Abridged and Edited, With an Introduction and Notes. (Hackett, 1996).
72.
Hardin, C. L. Are ‘Scientific’ Objects Coloured? Mind XCIII, 491–500 (1984).
73.
Ryan Wasserman. The Standard Objection to the Standard Account. Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition 111, 197–216 (2002).
74.
Bardon, Adrian, Dyke, Heather. Dana Goswick (2013) ‘Change and Identity over Time’ in A Companion to the Philosophy of Time, pp. 365-86. (Wiley-Blackwell, 2013).
75.
Judith Jarvis Thomson. The Statue and the Clay. Noûs 32, 149–173 (1998).
76.
Wasserman, Ryan. Material Constitution. https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/material-constitution/.
77.
Gallois, Andre. Identity Over Time. https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/identity-time/#4.4.
78.
Hawley, Katherine. Temporal Parts. https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/temporal-parts/.
79.
Rosen, G. A. Stephen Yablo, ‘A Thing and Its Matter’, in The Norton Introduction to Philosophy, pp. 517-522. (W.W. Norton, 2015).
80.
Burke, M. B. Copper Statues and Pieces of Copper: A Challenge to the Standard Account. Analysis 52, (1992).
81.
Roderick M. Chisholm. Parts as Essential to Their Wholes. The Review of Metaphysics 26, 581–603 (1973).
82.
Kit Fine. The Non-Identity of a Material Thing and Its Matter. Mind 112, 195–234 (2003).
83.
Thomson, J. J. Parthood and Identity Across Time. The Journal of Philosophy 80, (1983).
84.
Lewis, D. Counterparts of Persons and Their Bodies. The Journal of Philosophy 68, (1971).
