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Steup, Matthias, Turri, John, Sosa, Ernest. Jonathan Vogel, The Refutation of Skepticism, in Contemporary Debates in Epistemology, pp. 108-119. Wiley-Blackwell 2013. https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/nottingham/reader.action?docID=1245461&ppg=124
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Lemos NM. An introduction to the theory of knowledge. Cambridge: : Cambridge University Press 2007.
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Brueckner A. The Structure of the Skeptical Argument. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 1994;54. doi:10.2307/2108413
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Jonathan Vogel. Cartesian Skepticism and Inference to the Best Explanation. The Journal of Philosophy 1990;87:658–66.https://www.jstor.org/stable/2026858?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents
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Rosen GA. Alex Byrne, ‘Skepticism about the Internal World’, in The Norton Introduction to Philosophy, pp. 282-290. 1st ed. New York: : W.W. Norton 2015.
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Rosen GA. Gilbert Ryle, ‘Self-Knowledge’, in The Norton Introduction to Philosophy, pp. 274-282. 1st ed. New York: : W.W. Norton 2015.
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Vickers, John. The Problem of Induction. https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/induction-problem/
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Rosen GA. Peter Strawson, ‘The “Justification” of Induction’, in The Norton Introduction to Philosophy, pp. 151-159. 1st ed. New York: : W.W. Norton 2015.
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Harman GH. The Inference to the Best Explanation. The Philosophical Review 1965;74. doi:10.2307/2183532
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Lemos NM. An introduction to the theory of knowledge. Cambridge: : Cambridge University Press 2007. https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/nottingham/detail.action?docID=288614
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Rosen GA. Timothy Williamson, ‘Knowledge and Belief’ in The Norton Introduction to Philosophy, pp. 124-130. 1st ed. New York: : W.W. Norton 2015.
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Zagzebski L. The Inescapability of Gettier Problems. The Philosophical Quarterly 1994;44. doi:10.2307/2220147
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Ichikawa, Jonathan Jenkins. The Analysis of Knowledge. https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/knowledge-analysis/
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Armstrong DM. Belief, Truth and Knowledge. London: : Cambridge University Press 1973.
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Crane T. The Problem of Perception (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy/Winter 2014 Edition). http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2014/entries/perception-problem/
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Strawson PF. Perception and its Objects. In: Philosophical writings. Oxford: : Oxford University Press 2011. 125–45. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199587292.003.0011
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Lowe EJ. An introduction to the philosophy of mind. Cambridge: : Cambridge University Press 2000. https://nottingham-uk.alma.exlibrisgroup.com/view/action/uresolver.do?operation=resolveService&package_service_id=9474523920005561&institutionId=5561&customerId=5560
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Fogelin RJ. Routledge Philosophy Guidebook to Berkeley and the Principles of Human Knowledge. London: : Routledge 2001. http://www.NOTTINGHAM.eblib.com/EBLWeb/patron/?target=patron&extendedid=E_391816_0
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Soteriou, Matthew. The Disjunctive Theory of Perception. https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/perception-disjunctive/
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Lowe EJ. Indirect Perception and Sense Data. The Philosophical Quarterly 1981;31. doi:10.2307/2219403
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Logue H. Why naive realism? Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society (Hardback) 2012;112:211–37. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9264.2012.00332.x
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Martin MGF. The Limits of Self-Awareness. Philosophical Studies 2004;120:37–89. doi:10.1023/B:PHIL.0000033751.66949.97
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Fish, William. Philosophy of Perception. https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/nottingham/detail.action?docID=488018
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Dancy J. Arguments From Illusion. The Philosophical Quarterly 1995;45. doi:10.2307/2220307
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Martin MGF. The Transparency of Experience. Mind and Language 2002;17:376–425. doi:10.1111/1468-0017.00205
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Nagel J. Epistemic Intuitions. Philosophy Compass 2007;2:792–819. doi:10.1111/j.1747-9991.2007.00104.x
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Lowe EJ, MyiLibrary. The Routledge Guidebook to Locke’s Essay Concerning Human Understanding. [2nd ed.]. Abingdon, Oxon: : Routledge 2013. https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/nottingham/detail.action?docID=1125268
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Rosen GA. David Hume, ‘Of the Idea of Necessary Connection’, in The Norton Introduction to Philosophy, pp. 197-204. 1st ed. New York: : W.W. Norton 2015.
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Carroll JW, Markosian N. Chapter 2, in An Introduction to Metaphysics. Cambridge: : Cambridge University Press 2010.
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Rosen GA. John S. Mill, ‘The Method of Difference’, in The Norton Introduction to Philosophy, pp. 215-222. 1st ed. New York: : W.W. Norton 2015.
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Rosen GA. Ned Hall, ‘Causation and Correlation’, in The Norton Introduction to Philosophy, pp. 223-234. 1st ed. New York: : W.W. Norton 2015.
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Hume, David, Millican, Peter. Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding. OUP Oxford 2007. http://site.ebrary.com/lib/uon/reader.action?docID=10212199
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Rosen GA. David Hume, from ‘An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding’, Sections IV-V, in The Norton Introduction to Philosophy, pp. 141-149. 1st ed. New York: : W.W. Norton 2015.
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Rosen GA. David Hume, ‘Of Skepticism with Regard to the Senses’, in The Norton Introduction to Philosophy, pp. 302-312. 1st ed. New York: : W.W. Norton 2015.
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Thomasson AL. The Controversy over the Existence of Ordinary Objects. Philosophy Compass 2010;5:591–601. doi:10.1111/j.1747-9991.2010.00303.x
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Loux MJ, Zimmerman DW. Chapter 5, Peter van Inwagen, ‘Existence, Ontological Committment, and Fictional Entities’, in The Oxford Handbook of Metaphysics. Oxford: : Oxford University Press 2003.
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Maurin A-S. Bradley’s Regress. Philosophy Compass 2012;7:794–807. doi:10.1111/j.1747-9991.2012.00516.x
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Alex Oliver. The Metaphysics of Properties. Mind 1996;105:1–80.http://www.jstor.org/stable/2254537?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents
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Max Black. The Identity of Indiscernibles. Mind 1952;61:153–64.http://www.jstor.org/stable/2252291?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents
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Rosen GA. John Locke, ‘Some Further Considerations Concerning Our Simple Ideas’, in The Norton Introduction to Philosophy, pp. 457-464. 1st ed. New York: : W.W. Norton 2015.
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Lowe EJ, MyiLibrary. Chapter 3, ‘Perception’, in The Routledge Guidebook to Locke’s Essay Concerning Human Understanding, pp. 34-65. [2nd ed.]. Abingdon, Oxon: : Routledge 2013. https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/nottingham/detail.action?docID=1125268
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Smith AD. Of Primary and Secondary Qualities. The Philosophical Review 1990;99. doi:10.2307/2185490
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Paul A. Boghossian and J. David Velleman. Colour as a Secondary Quality. Mind 1989;98:81–103.http://www.jstor.org/stable/2255062?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents
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Rosen GA. David M. Armstrong, ‘The Secondary Qualities’, in The Norton Introduction to Philosophy, pp. 466-474. 1st ed. New York: : W.W. Norton 2015.
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Martha Brandt Bolton. The Origins of Locke’s Doctrine of Primary and Secondary Qualities. The Philosophical Quarterly 1976;26:305–16.http://www.jstor.org/stable/2218861?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents
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Rosen GA. Colin McGinn, ‘Secondary Qualities’, in The Norton Introduction to Philosophy, pp. 483-490. 1st ed. New York: : W.W. Norton 2015.
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Locke J, Winkler K. An Essay Concerning Human Understanding: Abridged and Edited, With an Introduction and Notes. Indianapolis, Ind: : Hackett 1996.
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Hardin CL. Are ‘Scientific’ Objects Coloured? Mind 1984;XCIII:491–500. doi:10.1093/mind/XCIII.372.491
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Ryan Wasserman. The Standard Objection to the Standard Account. Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition 2002;111:197–216.http://www.jstor.org/stable/4321317?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents
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Bardon, Adrian, Dyke, Heather. Dana Goswick (2013) ‘Change and Identity over Time’ in A Companion to the Philosophy of Time, pp. 365-86. Wiley-Blackwell 2013. https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/nottingham/reader.action?docID=3422113&ppg=385
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Judith Jarvis Thomson. The Statue and the Clay. Noûs 1998;32:149–73.http://www.jstor.org/stable/2671962
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Wasserman, Ryan. Material Constitution. https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/material-constitution/
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Gallois, Andre. Identity Over Time. https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/identity-time/#4.4
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Hawley, Katherine. Temporal Parts. https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/temporal-parts/
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Rosen GA. Stephen Yablo, ‘A Thing and Its Matter’, in The Norton Introduction to Philosophy, pp. 517-522. 1st ed. New York: : W.W. Norton 2015.
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Burke MB. Copper Statues and Pieces of Copper: A Challenge to the Standard Account. Analysis 1992;52. doi:10.2307/3328875
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Kit Fine. The Non-Identity of a Material Thing and Its Matter. Mind 2003;112:195–234.http://www.jstor.org/stable/3093593
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Thomson JJ. Parthood and Identity Across Time. The Journal of Philosophy 1983;80. doi:10.2307/2026004
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