Alex Oliver. 1996. ‘The Metaphysics of Properties’. Mind 105(417):1–80.
Anon. n.d. A Treatise of Human Nature, by David Hume.
Armstrong, D. M. 1973. Belief, Truth and Knowledge. London: Cambridge University Press.
Bardon, Adrian, Dyke, Heather. 2013. Dana Goswick (2013) ‘Change and Identity over Time’ in A Companion to the Philosophy of Time, Pp. 365-86. Wiley-Blackwell.
Berkeley, George, Howard Robinson, and George Berkeley. 1999. Principles of Human Knowledge: And, Three Dialogues. Vol. Oxford world’s classics. [New ed.]. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Brueckner, Anthony. 1994. ‘The Structure of the Skeptical Argument’. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 54(4). doi: 10.2307/2108413.
Brueckner, Anthony L. 1986. ‘Brains in a Vat’. The Journal of Philosophy 83(3).
Brueckner, Anthony and Oxford University Press. 2010. Essays on Skepticism. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Bryan Frances. 2005. ‘When a Skeptical Hypothesis Is Live’. Noûs 39(4):559–95.
Burke, Michael B. 1992. ‘Copper Statues and Pieces of Copper: A Challenge to the Standard Account’. Analysis 52(1). doi: 10.2307/3328875.
Carroll, John W., and Ned Markosian. 2010a. Chapter 2, in An Introduction to Metaphysics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Carroll, John W., and Ned Markosian. 2010b. Chapters 8 and 9, in An Introduction to Metaphysics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Crane, Tim. n.d. ‘The Problem of Perception (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy/Winter 2014 Edition)’. Retrieved (http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2014/entries/perception-problem/).
Cunning, David. 2014. The Cambridge Companion to Descartes’ Meditations. Vol. Cambridge companions to philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Dancy, Jonathan. 1995. ‘Arguments From Illusion’. The Philosophical Quarterly 45(181). doi: 10.2307/2220307.
DeRose, Keith, and Ted A. Warfield. 1999. Skepticism: A Contemporary Reader. New York: Oxford University Press.
Descartes, René, and Michael Moriarty. 2008. Meditations on First Philosophy: With Selections from the Objections and Replies. Vol. Oxford world’s classics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Fish, William. n.d. Philosophy of Perception.
Fogelin, Robert J. 2001. Routledge Philosophy Guidebook to Berkeley and the Principles of Human Knowledge. Vol. Routledge philosophy guidebooks. London: Routledge.
Gallois, Andre. n.d. ‘Identity Over Time’. Retrieved (https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/identity-time/#4.4).
Gertler, Brie. n.d. ‘Self-Knowledge’. Retrieved (https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/self-knowledge/).
Gettier, Edmund L. 1963. ‘Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?’ Analysis 23(6). doi: 10.2307/3326922.
Greco, John. 2007. ‘External World Skepticism’. Philosophy Compass 2(4):625–49. doi: 10.1111/j.1747-9991.2007.00090.x.
Greco, John, and Ernest Sosa. 1999. Linda Zagzebski ‘What Is Knowledge?’, In The Blackwell Guide to Epistemology, Pp. 92-116. Vol. Blackwell philosophy guides. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
Hardin, C. L. 1984. ‘Are “Scientific” Objects Coloured?’ Mind XCIII(372):491–500. doi: 10.1093/mind/XCIII.372.491.
Harman, Gilbert H. 1965. ‘The Inference to the Best Explanation’. The Philosophical Review 74(1). doi: 10.2307/2183532.
Hawley, Katherine. n.d. ‘Temporal Parts’. Retrieved (https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/temporal-parts/).
Hickey, Lance. n.d. ‘Brain in a Vat Argument’. Retrieved (http://www.iep.utm.edu/brainvat/).
Hume, David, Millican, Peter. 2007. Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding. OUP Oxford.
Ichikawa, Jonathan Jenkins. n.d. ‘The Analysis of Knowledge’. Retrieved (https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/knowledge-analysis/).
Jonathan Vogel. 1990. ‘Cartesian Skepticism and Inference to the Best Explanation’. The Journal of Philosophy 87(11):658–66.
Judith Jarvis Thomson. 1998. ‘The Statue and the Clay’. Noûs 32(2):149–73.
Kit Fine. 2003. ‘The Non-Identity of a Material Thing and Its Matter’. Mind 112(446):195–234.
Klein, Peter. n.d. ‘Skepticism’. Retrieved (https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/skepticism/).
Lemos, Noah Marcelino. 2007a. An Introduction to the Theory of Knowledge. Vol. Cambridge introductions to philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Lemos, Noah Marcelino. 2007b. An Introduction to the Theory of Knowledge. Vol. Cambridge introductions to philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Lewis, David. 1971. ‘Counterparts of Persons and Their Bodies’. The Journal of Philosophy 68(7). doi: 10.2307/2024902.
Locke, John, and Kenneth Winkler. 1996. An Essay Concerning Human Understanding: Abridged and Edited, With an Introduction and Notes. Indianapolis, Ind: Hackett.
Logue, Heather. 2012. ‘Why Naive Realism?’ Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society (Hardback) 112(2pt2):211–37. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9264.2012.00332.x.
Loux, Michael J., and Dean W. Zimmerman. 2003. Chapter 5, Peter van Inwagen, ‘Existence, Ontological Committment, and Fictional Entities’, in The Oxford Handbook of Metaphysics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Lowe, E. J. 1981. ‘Indirect Perception and Sense Data’. The Philosophical Quarterly 31(125). doi: 10.2307/2219403.
Lowe, E. J. 2000a. An Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Lowe, E. J. 2000b. An Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Lowe, E. J. and MyiLibrary. 2013a. Chapter 3, ‘Perception’, in The Routledge Guidebook to Locke’s Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Pp. 34-65. Vol. Routledge guides to the great books. [2nd ed.]. Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge.
Lowe, E. J. and MyiLibrary. 2013b. The Routledge Guidebook to Locke’s Essay Concerning Human Understanding. Vol. Routledge guides to the great books. [2nd ed.]. Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge.
Martha Brandt Bolton. 1976. ‘The Origins of Locke’s Doctrine of Primary and Secondary Qualities’. The Philosophical Quarterly 26(105):305–16.
Martin, M. G. F. 2002. ‘The Transparency of Experience’. Mind and Language 17(4):376–425. doi: 10.1111/1468-0017.00205.
Martin, M. G. F. 2004. ‘The Limits of Self-Awareness’. Philosophical Studies 120(1–3):37–89. doi: 10.1023/B:PHIL.0000033751.66949.97.
Maurin, Anna-Sofia. 2012. ‘Bradley’s Regress’. Philosophy Compass 7(11):794–807. doi: 10.1111/j.1747-9991.2012.00516.x.
Max Black. 1952. ‘The Identity of Indiscernibles’. Mind 61(242):153–64.
Nagel, Jennifer. 2007. ‘Epistemic Intuitions’. Philosophy Compass 2(6):792–819. doi: 10.1111/j.1747-9991.2007.00104.x.
Paul A. Boghossian and J. David Velleman. 1989. ‘Colour as a Secondary Quality’. Mind 98(389):81–103.
Roderick M. Chisholm. 1973. ‘Parts as Essential to Their Wholes’. The Review of Metaphysics 26(4):581–603.
Rosen, Gideon A. 2015a. Alex Byrne, ‘Skepticism about the Internal World’, in The Norton Introduction to Philosophy, Pp. 282-290. 1st ed. New York: W.W. Norton.
Rosen, Gideon A. 2015b. Colin McGinn, ‘Secondary Qualities’, in The Norton Introduction to Philosophy, Pp. 483-490. 1st ed. New York: W.W. Norton.
Rosen, Gideon A. 2015c. David Hume, from ‘An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding’, Sections IV-V, in The Norton Introduction to Philosophy, Pp. 141-149. 1st ed. New York: W.W. Norton.
Rosen, Gideon A. 2015d. David Hume, ‘Of Skepticism with Regard to the Senses’, in The Norton Introduction to Philosophy, Pp. 302-312. 1st ed. New York: W.W. Norton.
Rosen, Gideon A. 2015e. David Hume, ‘Of the Idea of Necessary Connection’, in The Norton Introduction to Philosophy, Pp. 197-204. 1st ed. New York: W.W. Norton.
Rosen, Gideon A. 2015f. David M. Armstrong, ‘Introspection’, in The Norton Introduction to Philosophy, Pp. 265-273. 1st ed. New York: W.W. Norton.
Rosen, Gideon A. 2015g. David M. Armstrong, ‘The Secondary Qualities’, in The Norton Introduction to Philosophy, Pp. 466-474. 1st ed. New York: W.W. Norton.
Rosen, Gideon A. 2015h. Gilbert Ryle, ‘Self-Knowledge’, in The Norton Introduction to Philosophy, Pp. 274-282. 1st ed. New York: W.W. Norton.
Rosen, Gideon A. 2015i. John Locke, ‘Some Further Considerations Concerning Our Simple Ideas’, in The Norton Introduction to Philosophy, Pp. 457-464. 1st ed. New York: W.W. Norton.
Rosen, Gideon A. 2015j. John S. Mill, ‘The Method of Difference’, in The Norton Introduction to Philosophy, Pp. 215-222. 1st ed. New York: W.W. Norton.
Rosen, Gideon A. 2015k. Michael Tye, ‘The Puzzle of Transparency’, in The Norton Introduction to Philosophy, Pp. 439-447. 1st ed. New York: W.W. Norton.
Rosen, Gideon A. 2015l. Ned Hall, ‘Causation and Correlation’, in The Norton Introduction to Philosophy, Pp. 223-234. 1st ed. New York: W.W. Norton.
Rosen, Gideon A. 2015m. Peter Strawson, ‘The “Justification” of Induction’, in The Norton Introduction to Philosophy, Pp. 151-159. 1st ed. New York: W.W. Norton.
Rosen, Gideon A. 2015n. Stephen Yablo, ‘A Thing and Its Matter’, in The Norton Introduction to Philosophy, Pp. 517-522. 1st ed. New York: W.W. Norton.
Rosen, Gideon A. 2015o. Timothy Williamson, ‘Knowledge and Belief’ in The Norton Introduction to Philosophy, Pp. 124-130. 1st ed. New York: W.W. Norton.
Russell, Bertrand. 1998. The Problems of Philosophy. 2nd ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Ryan Wasserman. 2002. ‘The Standard Objection to the Standard Account’. Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition 111(3):197–216.
Shoemaker, Sydney. 1990. ‘Qualities and Qualia: What’s in the Mind?’ Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 50. doi: 10.2307/2108035.
Siegel, Susanna. 2006. ‘Direct Realism and Perceptual Consciousness’. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73(2):378–410. doi: 10.1111/j.1933-1592.2006.tb00623.x.
Smith, A. D. 1990. ‘Of Primary and Secondary Qualities’. The Philosophical Review 99(2). doi: 10.2307/2185490.
Soteriou, Matthew. n.d. ‘The Disjunctive Theory of Perception’. Retrieved (https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/perception-disjunctive/).
Steup, Matthias. n.d. ‘Epistemology’. Retrieved (https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/epistemology/).
Steup, Matthias, Turri, John, Sosa, Ernest. 2013. Jonathan Vogel, The Refutation of Skepticism, in Contemporary Debates in Epistemology, Pp. 108-119. Wiley-Blackwell.
Strawson, P. F. 2011. ‘Perception and Its Objects’. Pp. 125–45 in Philosophical writings. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Thomasson, Amie L. 2010. ‘The Controversy over the Existence of Ordinary Objects’. Philosophy Compass 5(7):591–601. doi: 10.1111/j.1747-9991.2010.00303.x.
Thomson, Judith Jarvis. 1983. ‘Parthood and Identity Across Time’. The Journal of Philosophy 80(4). doi: 10.2307/2026004.
van Inwagen, Peter. n.d. ‘Metaphysics’. Retrieved (https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/metaphysics/).
Vickers, John. n.d. ‘The Problem of Induction’. Retrieved (https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/induction-problem/).
Wasserman, Ryan. n.d. ‘Material Constitution’. Retrieved (https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/material-constitution/).
Wright, Crispin. 1992. ‘On Putman’s Proof That We Are Not Brains-in-a-Vat’. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 92.
Zagzebski, Linda. 1994. ‘The Inescapability of Gettier Problems’. The Philosophical Quarterly 44(174). doi: 10.2307/2220147.