A Treatise of Human Nature, by David Hume. (n.d.). https://www.gutenberg.org/files/4705/4705-h/4705-h.htm#link2H_4_0026
Alex Oliver. (1996). The Metaphysics of Properties. Mind, 105(417), 1–80. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2254537?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents
Armstrong, D. M. (1973). Belief, Truth and Knowledge. Cambridge University Press.
Bardon, Adrian, Dyke, Heather. (2013). Dana Goswick (2013) ‘Change and Identity over Time’ in A Companion to the Philosophy of Time, pp. 365-86. Wiley-Blackwell. https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/nottingham/reader.action?docID=3422113&ppg=385
Berkeley, G., Robinson, H., & Berkeley, G. (1999). Principles of human knowledge: and, Three dialogues: Vol. Oxford world’s classics ([New ed.]) [Electronic resource]. Oxford University Press. http://www.vlebooks.com/vleweb/product/openreader?id=Nottingham&isbn=9780191592508
Brueckner, A. (1994). The Structure of the Skeptical Argument. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 54(4). https://doi.org/10.2307/2108413
Brueckner, A. L. (1986). Brains in a Vat. The Journal of Philosophy, 83(3). http://www.jstor.org/discover/10.2307/2026572?uid=2&uid=4&sid=21104642255653
Brueckner, A. & Oxford University Press. (2010). Essays on skepticism [Electronic resource]. Oxford University Press. http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/oso/public/content/philosophy/9780199585861/toc.html
Bryan Frances. (2005). When a Skeptical Hypothesis Is Live. Noûs, 39(4), 559–595. http://www.jstor.org/stable/3506112?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents
Burke, M. B. (1992). Copper Statues and Pieces of Copper: A Challenge to the Standard Account. Analysis, 52(1). https://doi.org/10.2307/3328875
Carroll, J. W., & Markosian, N. (2010a). Chapter 2, in An Introduction to Metaphysics. Cambridge University Press.
Carroll, J. W., & Markosian, N. (2010b). Chapters 8 and 9, in An Introduction to Metaphysics. Cambridge University Press.
Crane, T. (n.d.). The Problem of Perception (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy/Winter 2014 Edition). http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2014/entries/perception-problem/
Cunning, D. (2014). The Cambridge Companion to Descartes’ Meditations: Vol. Cambridge companions to philosophy [Electronic resource]. Cambridge University Press. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCO9781139088220
Dancy, J. (1995). Arguments From Illusion. The Philosophical Quarterly, 45(181). https://doi.org/10.2307/2220307
DeRose, K., & Warfield, T. A. (1999). Skepticism: A Contemporary Reader. Oxford University Press.
Descartes, R., & Moriarty, M. (2008). Meditations on first philosophy: with selections from the Objections and replies: Vol. Oxford world’s classics [Electronic resource]. Oxford University Press. http://www.vlebooks.com/vleweb/product/openreader?id=Nottingham&isbn=9780191539718
Fish, William. (n.d.). Philosophy of Perception. https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/nottingham/detail.action?docID=488018
Fogelin, R. J. (2001). Routledge Philosophy Guidebook to Berkeley and the Principles of Human Knowledge: Vol. Routledge philosophy guidebooks [Electronic resource]. Routledge. http://www.NOTTINGHAM.eblib.com/EBLWeb/patron/?target=patron&extendedid=E_391816_0
Gallois, Andre. (n.d.). Identity Over Time. https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/identity-time/#4.4
Gertler, Brie. (n.d.). Self-Knowledge. https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/self-knowledge/
Gettier, E. L. (1963). Is Justified True Belief Knowledge? Analysis, 23(6). https://doi.org/10.2307/3326922
Greco, J. (2007). External World Skepticism. Philosophy Compass, 2(4), 625–649. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1747-9991.2007.00090.x
Greco, J., & Sosa, E. (1999). Linda Zagzebski ‘What is Knowledge?’, in The Blackwell Guide to Epistemology, pp. 92-116: Vol. Blackwell philosophy guides. Blackwell Publishers.
Hardin, C. L. (1984). Are ‘Scientific’ Objects Coloured? Mind, XCIII(372), 491–500. https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/XCIII.372.491
Harman, G. H. (1965). The Inference to the Best Explanation. The Philosophical Review, 74(1). https://doi.org/10.2307/2183532
Hawley, Katherine. (n.d.). Temporal Parts. https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/temporal-parts/
Hickey, L. (n.d.). Brain in a Vat Argument. http://www.iep.utm.edu/brainvat/
Hume, David, Millican, Peter. (2007). Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding. OUP Oxford. http://site.ebrary.com/lib/uon/reader.action?docID=10212199
Ichikawa, Jonathan Jenkins. (n.d.). The Analysis of Knowledge. https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/knowledge-analysis/
Jonathan Vogel. (1990). Cartesian Skepticism and Inference to the Best Explanation. The Journal of Philosophy, 87(11), 658–666. https://www.jstor.org/stable/2026858?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents
Judith Jarvis Thomson. (1998). The Statue and the Clay. Noûs, 32(2), 149–173. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2671962
Kit Fine. (2003). The Non-Identity of a Material Thing and Its Matter. Mind, 112(446), 195–234. http://www.jstor.org/stable/3093593
Klein, Peter. (n.d.). Skepticism. https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/skepticism/
Lemos, N. M. (2007a). An introduction to the theory of knowledge: Vol. Cambridge introductions to philosophy. Cambridge University Press.
Lemos, N. M. (2007b). An introduction to the theory of knowledge: Vol. Cambridge introductions to philosophy. Cambridge University Press. https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/nottingham/detail.action?docID=288614
Lewis, D. (1971). Counterparts of Persons and Their Bodies. The Journal of Philosophy, 68(7). https://doi.org/10.2307/2024902
Locke, J., & Winkler, K. (1996). An Essay Concerning Human Understanding: Abridged and Edited, With an Introduction and Notes. Hackett.
Logue, H. (2012). Why naive realism? Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society (Hardback), 112(2pt2), 211–237. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9264.2012.00332.x
Loux, M. J., & Zimmerman, D. W. (2003). Chapter 5, Peter van Inwagen, ‘Existence, Ontological Committment, and Fictional Entities’, in The Oxford Handbook of Metaphysics. Oxford University Press.
Lowe, E. J. (1981). Indirect Perception and Sense Data. The Philosophical Quarterly, 31(125). https://doi.org/10.2307/2219403
Lowe, E. J. (2000a). An introduction to the philosophy of mind [Electronic resource]. Cambridge University Press. https://nottingham-uk.alma.exlibrisgroup.com/view/action/uresolver.do?operation=resolveService&package_service_id=9474523920005561&institutionId=5561&customerId=5560
Lowe, E. J. (2000b). An introduction to the philosophy of mind [Electronic resource]. Cambridge University Press. https://nottingham-uk.alma.exlibrisgroup.com/view/action/uresolver.do?operation=resolveService&package_service_id=9474267270005561&institutionId=5561&customerId=5560
Lowe, E. J. & MyiLibrary. (2013a). Chapter 3, ‘Perception’, in The Routledge Guidebook to Locke’s Essay Concerning Human Understanding, pp. 34-65: Vol. Routledge guides to the great books ([2nd ed.]) [Electronic resource]. Routledge. https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/nottingham/detail.action?docID=1125268
Lowe, E. J. & MyiLibrary. (2013b). The Routledge Guidebook to Locke’s Essay Concerning Human Understanding: Vol. Routledge guides to the great books ([2nd ed.]) [Electronic resource]. Routledge. https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/nottingham/detail.action?docID=1125268
Martha Brandt Bolton. (1976). The Origins of Locke’s Doctrine of Primary and Secondary Qualities. The Philosophical Quarterly, 26(105), 305–316. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2218861?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents
Martin, M. G. F. (2002). The Transparency of Experience. Mind and Language, 17(4), 376–425. https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0017.00205
Martin, M. G. F. (2004). The Limits of Self-Awareness. Philosophical Studies, 120(1–3), 37–89. https://doi.org/10.1023/B:PHIL.0000033751.66949.97
Maurin, A.-S. (2012). Bradley’s Regress. Philosophy Compass, 7(11), 794–807. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1747-9991.2012.00516.x
Max Black. (1952). The Identity of Indiscernibles. Mind, 61(242), 153–164. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2252291?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents
Nagel, J. (2007). Epistemic Intuitions. Philosophy Compass, 2(6), 792–819. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1747-9991.2007.00104.x
Paul A. Boghossian and J. David Velleman. (1989). Colour as a Secondary Quality. Mind, 98(389), 81–103. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2255062?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents
Roderick M. Chisholm. (1973). Parts as Essential to Their Wholes. The Review of Metaphysics, 26(4), 581–603. http://www.jstor.org/stable/20126296?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents
Rosen, G. A. (2015a). Alex Byrne, ‘Skepticism about the Internal World’, in The Norton Introduction to Philosophy, pp. 282-290 (1st ed). W.W. Norton.
Rosen, G. A. (2015b). Colin McGinn, ‘Secondary Qualities’, in The Norton Introduction to Philosophy, pp. 483-490 (1st ed). W.W. Norton.
Rosen, G. A. (2015c). David Hume, from ‘An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding’, Sections IV-V, in The Norton Introduction to Philosophy, pp. 141-149 (1st ed). W.W. Norton.
Rosen, G. A. (2015d). David Hume, ‘Of Skepticism with Regard to the Senses’, in The Norton Introduction to Philosophy, pp. 302-312 (1st ed). W.W. Norton.
Rosen, G. A. (2015e). David Hume, ‘Of the Idea of Necessary Connection’, in The Norton Introduction to Philosophy, pp. 197-204 (1st ed). W.W. Norton.
Rosen, G. A. (2015f). David M. Armstrong, ‘Introspection’, in The Norton Introduction to Philosophy, pp. 265-273 (1st ed). W.W. Norton.
Rosen, G. A. (2015g). David M. Armstrong, ‘The Secondary Qualities’, in The Norton Introduction to Philosophy, pp. 466-474 (1st ed). W.W. Norton.
Rosen, G. A. (2015h). Gilbert Ryle, ‘Self-Knowledge’, in The Norton Introduction to Philosophy, pp. 274-282 (1st ed). W.W. Norton.
Rosen, G. A. (2015i). John Locke, ‘Some Further Considerations Concerning Our Simple Ideas’, in The Norton Introduction to Philosophy, pp. 457-464 (1st ed). W.W. Norton.
Rosen, G. A. (2015j). John S. Mill, ‘The Method of Difference’, in The Norton Introduction to Philosophy, pp. 215-222 (1st ed). W.W. Norton.
Rosen, G. A. (2015k). Michael Tye, ‘The Puzzle of Transparency’, in The Norton Introduction to Philosophy, pp. 439-447 (1st ed). W.W. Norton.
Rosen, G. A. (2015l). Ned Hall, ‘Causation and Correlation’, in The Norton Introduction to Philosophy, pp. 223-234 (1st ed). W.W. Norton.
Rosen, G. A. (2015m). Peter Strawson, ‘The “Justification” of Induction’, in The Norton Introduction to Philosophy, pp. 151-159 (1st ed). W.W. Norton.
Rosen, G. A. (2015n). Stephen Yablo, ‘A Thing and Its Matter’, in The Norton Introduction to Philosophy, pp. 517-522 (1st ed). W.W. Norton.
Rosen, G. A. (2015o). Timothy Williamson, ‘Knowledge and Belief’ in The Norton Introduction to Philosophy, pp. 124-130 (1st ed). W.W. Norton.
Russell, B. (1998). The problems of philosophy (2nd ed). Oxford University Press. http://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/5827
Ryan Wasserman. (2002). The Standard Objection to the Standard Account. Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition, 111(3), 197–216. http://www.jstor.org/stable/4321317?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents
Shoemaker, S. (1990). Qualities and Qualia: What’s in the Mind? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 50. https://doi.org/10.2307/2108035
Siegel, S. (2006). Direct Realism and Perceptual Consciousness. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 73(2), 378–410. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2006.tb00623.x
Smith, A. D. (1990). Of Primary and Secondary Qualities. The Philosophical Review, 99(2). https://doi.org/10.2307/2185490
Soteriou, Matthew. (n.d.). The Disjunctive Theory of Perception. https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/perception-disjunctive/
Steup, Matthias. (n.d.). Epistemology. https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/epistemology/
Steup, Matthias, Turri, John, Sosa, Ernest. (2013). Jonathan Vogel, The Refutation of Skepticism, in Contemporary Debates in Epistemology, pp. 108-119. Wiley-Blackwell. https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/nottingham/reader.action?docID=1245461&ppg=124
Strawson, P. F. (2011). Perception and its Objects. In Philosophical writings (pp. 125–145). Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199587292.003.0011
Thomasson, A. L. (2010). The Controversy over the Existence of Ordinary Objects. Philosophy Compass, 5(7), 591–601. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1747-9991.2010.00303.x
Thomson, J. J. (1983). Parthood and Identity Across Time. The Journal of Philosophy, 80(4). https://doi.org/10.2307/2026004
van Inwagen, Peter. (n.d.). Metaphysics. https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/metaphysics/
Vickers, John. (n.d.). The Problem of Induction. https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/induction-problem/
Wasserman, Ryan. (n.d.). Material Constitution. https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/material-constitution/
Wright, C. (1992). On Putman’s Proof that we are not Brains-in-a-Vat. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 92. http://www.jstor.org/discover/10.2307/4545146?uid=2&uid=4&sid=21104642255653
Zagzebski, L. (1994). The Inescapability of Gettier Problems. The Philosophical Quarterly, 44(174). https://doi.org/10.2307/2220147
