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Fogelin, Robert J. 2001. Routledge Philosophy Guidebook to Berkeley and the Principles of Human Knowledge (London: Routledge) <http://www.NOTTINGHAM.eblib.com/EBLWeb/patron/?target=patron&extendedid=E_391816_0>
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Lemos, Noah Marcelino. 2007a. An Introduction to the Theory of Knowledge (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press)
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———. 2013b. The Routledge Guidebook to Locke’s Essay Concerning Human Understanding, [2nd ed.] (Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge) <https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/nottingham/detail.action?docID=1125268>
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———. 2015b. Colin McGinn, ‘Secondary Qualities’, in The Norton Introduction to Philosophy, Pp. 483-490, 1st ed (New York: W.W. Norton)
———. 2015c. David Hume, from ‘An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding’, Sections IV-V, in The Norton Introduction to Philosophy, Pp. 141-149, 1st ed (New York: W.W. Norton)
———. 2015d. David Hume, ‘Of Skepticism with Regard to the Senses’, in The Norton Introduction to Philosophy, Pp. 302-312, 1st ed (New York: W.W. Norton)
———. 2015e. David Hume, ‘Of the Idea of Necessary Connection’, in The Norton Introduction to Philosophy, Pp. 197-204, 1st ed (New York: W.W. Norton)
———. 2015f. David M. Armstrong, ‘Introspection’, in The Norton Introduction to Philosophy, Pp. 265-273, 1st ed (New York: W.W. Norton)
———. 2015g. David M. Armstrong, ‘The Secondary Qualities’, in The Norton Introduction to Philosophy, Pp. 466-474, 1st ed (New York: W.W. Norton)
———. 2015h. Gilbert Ryle, ‘Self-Knowledge’, in The Norton Introduction to Philosophy, Pp. 274-282, 1st ed (New York: W.W. Norton)
———. 2015i. John Locke, ‘Some Further Considerations Concerning Our Simple Ideas’, in The Norton Introduction to Philosophy, Pp. 457-464, 1st ed (New York: W.W. Norton)
———. 2015j. John S. Mill, ‘The Method of Difference’, in The Norton Introduction to Philosophy, Pp. 215-222, 1st ed (New York: W.W. Norton)
———. 2015k. Michael Tye, ‘The Puzzle of Transparency’, in The Norton Introduction to Philosophy, Pp. 439-447, 1st ed (New York: W.W. Norton)
———. 2015l. Ned Hall, ‘Causation and Correlation’, in The Norton Introduction to Philosophy, Pp. 223-234, 1st ed (New York: W.W. Norton)
———. 2015m. Peter Strawson, ‘The “Justification” of Induction’, in The Norton Introduction to Philosophy, Pp. 151-159, 1st ed (New York: W.W. Norton)
———. 2015n. Stephen Yablo, ‘A Thing and Its Matter’, in The Norton Introduction to Philosophy, Pp. 517-522, 1st ed (New York: W.W. Norton)
———. 2015o. Timothy Williamson, ‘Knowledge and Belief’ in The Norton Introduction to Philosophy, Pp. 124-130, 1st ed (New York: W.W. Norton)
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