[1]
Aleksei, B. ‘Ukrainskii vyzov’ i alternativy vneshnei politiki Rossii. Mezhdunarodnye protsessy. 12, 4, 6–16.
[2]
Alexander L. George 1969. The ‘Operational Code’: A Neglected Approach to the Study of Political Leaders and Decision-Making. International Studies Quarterly. 13, 2 (1969), 190–222.
[3]
Allison, R. 2013. Russia, the West, and Military Intervention. Oxford University Press.
[4]
Allison, R. 2014. Russian ‘deniable’ intervention in Ukraine: how and why Russia broke the ru... International Affairs. (2014).
[5]
BARANOVSKII, V. 2016. Novaia vneshniaia politika Rossii: Vlianie na mezhdunarodnuiu sistemu. Mirovaia ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia. 60, 7 (2016), 5–15. DOI:https://doi.org/10.20542/0131-2227-2016-60-7-5-15.
[6]
Berryman, J. 2012. Geopolitics and Russian foreign policy. International Politics. 49, 4 (Jul. 2012), 530–544.
[7]
Biersack, J. and O’Lear, S. 2014. The geopolitics of Russia’s annexation of Crimea: narratives, identity, silences, and energy. Eurasian Geography and Economics. 55, 3 (May 2014), 247–269. DOI:https://doi.org/10.1080/15387216.2014.985241.
[8]
Black, C.E. 1962. Chapter 1, The Pattern of Russian Objectives. Russian foreign policy: essays in historical perspective. Yale University Press. 3–38.
[9]
Bock, A.M. et al. 2015. ‘If you compress the spring, it will snap back hard’: The Ukrainian crisis and the balance of threat theory. International Journal: Canada’s Journal of Global Policy Analysis. 70, 1 (Mar. 2015), 101–109. DOI:https://doi.org/10.1177/0020702014562593.
[10]
Booth, K. and Wheeler, N.J. 2008. The security dilemma: fear, cooperation and trust in world politics. Palgrave Macmillan.
[11]
Brown, A. 2007. Perestroika and the End of the Cold War. Cold War History. 7, 1 (Feb. 2007), 1–17. DOI:https://doi.org/10.1080/14682740701197631.
[12]
Browning, C. 2008. Reassessing Putin’s Project: Reflections on IR Theory and the West. Problems of Post-Communism. 55, 5 (Sep. 2008), 3–13. DOI:https://doi.org/10.2753/PPC1075-8216550501.
[13]
Bukkvoll, T. 2016. Why Putin went to war: ideology, interests and decision-making in the Russian use of force in Crimea and Donbas. Contemporary Politics. 22, 3 (Jul. 2016), 267–282. DOI:https://doi.org/10.1080/13569775.2016.1201310.
[14]
Charap, S. and Darden, K. 2014. Russia and Ukraine. Survival. 56, 2 (Mar. 2014), 7–14. DOI:https://doi.org/10.1080/00396338.2014.901726.
[15]
Charap, S. and Troitskiy, M. 2013. Russia, the West and the Integration Dilemma. Survival. 55, 6 (Dec. 2013), 49–62. DOI:https://doi.org/10.1080/00396338.2013.862935.
[16]
Charles L. Glaser 1997. The Security Dilemma Revisited. World Politics. 50, 1 (1997), 171–201.
[17]
Collins, Alan.R. 2000. GRIT, Gorbachev and the end of the Cold War. Review of International Studies. 24, 02 (2000), 201–219.
[18]
Curtiss, J.S. 1979. Russia’s Crimean War. Duke University Press.
[19]
Dafoe, A. et al. 2014. Reputation and Status as Motives for War. Annual Review of Political Science. 17, 1 (May 2014), 371–393. DOI:https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-polisci-071112-213421.
[20]
Daniel Deudney and G. John Ikenberry 1992. The International Sources of Soviet Change. International Security. 16, 3 (1992), 74–118.
[21]
Deborah Welch Larson and Alexei Shevchenko 2003. Shortcut to Greatness: The New Thinking and the Revolution in Soviet Foreign Policy. International Organization. 57, 1 (2003), 77–109.
[22]
Deborah Welch Larson and Alexei Shevchenko 2010. Status Seekers : Chinese and Russian Responses to U.S. Primacy. International Security. 34, 4 (2010), 63–95.
[23]
Douglas J. Macdonald 1996. Communist Bloc Expansion in the Early Cold War: Challenging Realism, Refuting Revisionism. International Security. 20, 3 (1996), 152–188.
[24]
Duncan, P.J.S. 2000. Russian messianism: third Rome, revolution, communism and after. Routledge.
[25]
English, Robert 2000. Russia and the Idea of the West : Gorbachev, Intellectuals, and the End of the Cold War. Columbia University Press.
[26]
Evan Braden Montgomery 2006. Breaking out of the Security Dilemma: Realism, Reassurance, and the Problem of Uncertainty. International Security. 31, 2 (2006), 151–185.
[27]
Fisher, A.W. 1970. The Russian annexation of the Crimea, 1772-1783. University Press.
[28]
Forsberg, T. et al. 2014. Status and emotions in Russian foreign policy. Communist and Post-Communist Studies. 47, 3–4 (Sep. 2014), 261–268. DOI:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.postcomstud.2014.09.007.
[29]
Freedman, L. 2014. Ukraine and the Art of Limited War. Survival. 56, 6 (Nov. 2014), 7–38. DOI:https://doi.org/10.1080/00396338.2014.985432.
[30]
Fuller, W.C. 1992. Chapter 3 Russian Imperialism and Military Power in the Eighteenth Century: Obstacles. Strategy and power in Russia, 1600-1914. Free Press. 85–124.
[31]
Fuller, W.C. 1992. Strategy and power in Russia, 1600-1914. Free Press.
[32]
Fuller, W.C. 1992. Strategy and power in Russia, 1600-1914. Free Press.
[33]
Garthoff, R.L. and Brookings Institution 1994. The great transition: American-Soviet relations and the end of the Cold War. Brookings Institution.
[34]
Geyer, D. 1987. Russian imperialism: the interaction of domestic and foreign policy, 1860-1914. Berg.
[35]
Gillard, D. 1977. The struggle for Asia, 1828-1914: a study in British and Russian imperialism. Methuen.
[36]
Gillard, D. 1977. The struggle for Asia, 1828-1914: a study in British and Russian imperialism. Methuen.
[37]
Glaser, C.L. 2010. Rational theory of international politics: the logic of competition and cooperation. Princeton University Press.
[38]
Goldfrank, D.M. 1994. The origins of the Crimean War. Longman.
[39]
Götz, E. 2016. Neorealism and Russia’s Ukraine policy, 1991–present. Contemporary Politics. 22, 3 (Jul. 2016), 301–323. DOI:https://doi.org/10.1080/13569775.2016.1201312.
[40]
Greenfeld, L. 1992. Nationalism: five roads to modernity. Harvard University Press.
[41]
Grimsted, P.K. 1969. The foreign ministers of Alexander I: political attitudes and the conduct of Russian diplomacy, 1801-1825. University of California Press.
[42]
Haas, M. de 2011. Russia’s foreign security policy in the 21st century: Putin, Medvedev and beyond. Routledge.
[43]
Hansen, F.S. 2016. Russia’s relations with the West: ontological security through conflict. Contemporary Politics. 22, 3 (Jul. 2016), 359–375. DOI:https://doi.org/10.1080/13569775.2016.1201314.
[44]
Harry Gelman 1984. The Brezhnev Politburo and the decline of detente. Cornell University Press.
[45]
Haslam, Jonathan 2011. Russia’s Cold War : From the October Revolution to the Fall of the Wall. Yale University Press.
[46]
Haslam, Jonathan 2011. Russia’s Cold War : From the October Revolution to the Fall of the Wall. Yale University Press.
[47]
Hugh Ragsdale 1988. Evaluating the Traditions of Russian Aggression: Catherine II and the Greek Project. The Slavonic and East European Review. 66, 1 (1988), 91–117.
[48]
IASC: The Hedgehog Review - Volume 17, No. 1 (Spring 2015) - Putin, Ukraine, and the Question of Realism -: http://www.iasc-culture.org/THR/THR_article_2015_Spring_OwenInboden.php.
[49]
Ingle, H.N. 1976. Nesselrode and the Russian rapprochement with Britain, 1836-1844. University of California Press.
[50]
Jack Snyder 1994. Russian Backwardness and the Future of Europe. Daedalus. 123, 2 (1994), 179–201.
[51]
Jack Snyder 1988. The Gorbachev Revolution: A Waning of Soviet Expansionism? International Security. 12, 3 (1988), 93–131.
[52]
Jack Snyder 1988. The Gorbachev Revolution: A Waning of Soviet Expansionism? International Security. 12, 3 (1988), 93–131.
[53]
Janice Gross Stein 1994. Political Learning by Doing: Gorbachev as Uncommitted Thinker and Motivated Learner. International Organization. 48, 2 (1994), 155–183.
[54]
Jeff Checkel 1993. Ideas, Institutions, and the Gorbachev Foreign Policy Revolution. World Politics. 45, 2 (1993), 271–300.
[55]
Jelavich, B. 1991. Russia’s Balkan entanglements, 1806-1914. Cambridge University Press.
[56]
Jervis, R. 1976. Perception and misperception in international politics. Princeton University Press.
[57]
Jervis, R. 2001. Was the Cold War a Security Dilemma? Journal of Cold War Studies. 3, 1 (Jan. 2001), 36–60.
[58]
John P. LeDonne 2006. Geopolitics, Logistics, and Grain: Russia’s Ambitions in the Black Sea Basin, 1737-1834. The International History Review. 28, 1 (2006), 1–41.
[59]
Kagan, K. 1997. The myth of the European concert: The realist‐institutionalist debate and great power behavior in the eastern question, 1821–41. Security Studies. 7, 2 (Dec. 1997), 1–57. DOI:https://doi.org/10.1080/09636419708429341.
[60]
Kanet, R.E. 2007. Russia: re-emerging great power. Palgrave Macmillan.
[61]
Karagiannis, E. 2014. The Russian Interventions in South Ossetia and Crimea Compared: Military Performance, Legitimacy and Goals. Contemporary Security Policy. 35, 3 (Sep. 2014), 400–420. DOI:https://doi.org/10.1080/13523260.2014.963965.
[62]
Katzenstein, P.J. and Weygandt, N. 2017. Mapping Eurasia in an Open World: How the Insularity of Russia’s Geopolitical and Civilizational Approaches Limits Its Foreign Policies. Perspectives on Politics. 15, 02 (Jun. 2017), 428–442. DOI:https://doi.org/10.1017/S153759271700010X.
[63]
Kennan, G. F. 1947. The Sources of Soviet Conduct. Foreign Affairs. 25, 4 (1947), 566–582.
[64]
Kohn, H. and Hunczak, T. 1974. Russian imperialism from Ivan the Great to the Revolution. Rutgers University Press.
[65]
Kohn, H. and Hunczak, T. 1974. Russian imperialism from Ivan the Great to the Revolution. Rutgers University Press.
[66]
Kropatcheva, E. 2012. Russian foreign policy in the realm of European security through the lens of neoclassical realism. Journal of Eurasian Studies. 3, 1 (Jan. 2012), 30–40. DOI:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.euras.2011.10.004.
[67]
Kydd, A. 1997. Sheep in Sheep’s clothing: Why security seekers do not fight each other. Security Studies. 7, 1 (Sep. 1997), 114–155. DOI:https://doi.org/10.1080/09636419708429336.
[68]
Lebow, R.N. 2008. A cultural theory of international relations. Cambridge University Press.
[69]
Lederer, I.J. 1962. Russian foreign policy: essays in historical perspective. Yale University Press.
[70]
LeDonne, J.P. 2004. The grand strategy of the Russian Empire, 1650-1831. Oxford University Press.
[71]
LeDonne, J.P. 1997. The Russian empire and the world, 1700-1917: the geopolitics of expansion and containment. Oxford University Press.
[72]
Legvold, R. 2007. Russian foreign policy in the twenty-first century and the shadow of the past. Columbia University Press.
[73]
MacFarlane, S.N. 2016. Kto vinovat? Why is there a crisis in Russia’s relations with the West? Contemporary Politics. 22, 3 (Jul. 2016), 342–358. DOI:https://doi.org/10.1080/13569775.2016.1201315.
[74]
Maoz, Z. 2004. Multiple paths to knowledge in international relations: methodology in the study of conflict management and conflict resolution. Lexington Books.
[75]
Markey, D. 1999. Prestige and the origins of war: Returning to realism’s roots. Security Studies. 8, 4 (Jun. 1999), 126–172. DOI:https://doi.org/10.1080/09636419908429388.
[76]
Matthew Evangelista 1995. The Paradox of State Strength: Transnational Relations, Domestic Structures, and Security Policy in Russia and the Soviet Union. International Organization. 49, 1 (1995), 1–38.
[77]
Matthew Rendall 2002. Restraint or Self-Restraint of Russia: Nicholas I, the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi, and the Vienna System, 1832-1841. The International History Review. 24, 1 (2002), 37–63.
[78]
Morozova, N. 2009. Geopolitics, Eurasianism and Russian Foreign Policy Under Putin. Geopolitics. 14, 4 (Nov. 2009), 667–686. DOI:https://doi.org/10.1080/14650040903141349.
[79]
Nicholas V. Riasanovsky 1952. Old Russia, the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. The American Slavic and East European Review. 11, 3 (1952), 171–188.
[80]
Nincic, M. 1989. Anatomy of hostility: The U.S.-Soviet rivalry in perspective. Harcourt Brace Jovanovich.
[81]
Nolʹde, B.Ė. 1952. La formation de l’Empire russe: études, notes et documents. Institut d’études slaves.
[82]
Nygren, B. 2008. The rebuilding of Greater Russia: Putin’s foreign policy towards the CIS countries. Routledge.
[83]
O. Halecki 1952. Imperialism in Slavic and East European History. The American Slavic and East European Review. 11, 1 (1952), 1–26.
[84]
Osteuropa-Institut München 1936. Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas. (1936).
[85]
Osteuropa-Institut München 1936. Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas. (1936).
[86]
Osteuropa-Institut München 1936. Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas. (1936).
[87]
Oye, K.A. 1995. Explaining the End of the Cold War: Morphological and Behavioral Adaptations to the Nuclear Peace? International relations theory and the end of the Cold War. Columbia University Press.
[88]
Putin’s Brain | Foreign Affairs: https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/russia-fsu/2014-03-31/putins-brain.
[89]
Raeff, M. 1972. Catherine the Great: a profile. Macmillan.
[90]
Ragsdale, H. and Ponomarev, V.N. 1993. Chapter 12, Persistent Factors in Russian Foreign Policy. Imperial Russian foreign policy. Cambridge University Press. 315–359.
[91]
Ragsdale, H. and Ponomarev, V.N. 1993. Imperial Russian foreign policy. Cambridge University Press.
[92]
Ragsdale, H. and Ponomarev, V.N. 1993. Imperial Russian foreign policy. Cambridge University Press.
[93]
Ragsdale, H. and Ponomarev, V.N. 1993. Imperial Russian foreign policy. Cambridge University Press.
[94]
Ragsdale, H. and Ponomarev, V.N. 1993. Imperial Russian foreign policy. Cambridge University Press.
[95]
Ragsdale, H. and Ponomarev, V.N. 1993. Imperial Russian foreign policy. Cambridge University Press.
[96]
RENDALL, M. 2006. Defensive realism and the Concert of Europe. Review of International Studies. 32, 03 (Jul. 2006). DOI:https://doi.org/10.1017/S0260210506007145.
[97]
Rendall, M. 2000. Russia, the concert of Europe, and Greece, 1821–29: A test of hypotheses about the Vienna system. Security Studies. 9, 4 (Jun. 2000), 52–90. DOI:https://doi.org/10.1080/09636410008429413.
[98]
Report on Peace: https://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1917/oct/25-26/26b.htm.
[99]
Richard Sakwa 2008. ‘New Cold War’ or Twenty Years’ Crisis? Russia and International Politics. International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-). 84, 2 (2008), 241–267.
[100]
Robert D. English 2002. Power, Ideas, and New Evidence on the Cold War’s End: A Reply to Brooks and Wohlforth. International Security. 26, 4 (2002), 70–92.
[101]
Robert Jervis 1978. Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma. World Politics. 30, 2 (1978), 167–214.
[102]
Sarah E. Mendelson 1993. Internal Battles and External Wars: Politics, Learning, and the Soviet Withdrawal from Afghanistan. World Politics. 45, 3 (1993), 327–360.
[103]
Schiemann, T. 1904. Geschichte Russlands unter Kaiser Nikolaus I. G. Reimer.
[104]
Schroeder, P.W. 1972. Austria, Great Britain, and the Crimean War: the destruction of the European Concert. Cornell University Press.
[105]
Schroeder, P.W. 1994. The transformation of European politics, 1763-1848. Clarendon Press.
[106]
Schütz, E. 1975. Die europäische Allianzpolitik Alexanders I. und der griechische Unabhängigkeitskampf, 1820-1830. O. Harrassowitz.
[107]
Schweller, R.L. 1996. Neorealism’s Status-Quo Bias: What Security Dilemma? Realism: restatements and renewal. Frank Cass. 90–121.
[108]
Sked, A. 1979. Europe’s balance of power, 1815-1848. Macmillan.
[109]
Stephen G. Brooks and William C. Wohlforth 2001. Power, Globalization, and the End of the Cold War: Reevaluating a Landmark Case for Ideas. International Security. 25, 3 (2001), 5–53.
[110]
Stephen Van Evera 1998. Offense, Defense, and the Causes of War. International Security. 22, 4 (1998), 5–43.
[111]
Sunderland, W. 2006. Taming the wild field: colonization and empire on the Russian steppe. Cornell University Press.
[112]
Tarle, E.V. 1966. Krymskai︠a︡ voĭna. University Microfilms.
[113]
Tatishchev, S.S. 1887. Vnieshniaia politika imperatora Nikolaia pervago: vvdenie v istoriiu vnieshnikh snoshenii Rossii v epokhu sevastopol’skoi voiny.
[114]
The Long Telegram: 1946. http://www.ntanet.net/KENNAN.html.
[115]
Theiler, T. The Microfoundations of Diversionary Conflict.
[116]
Thomas Risse-Kappen 1994. Ideas do not Float Freely: Transnational Coalitions, Domestic Structures, and the End of the Cold War. International Organization. 48, 2 (1994), 185–214.
[117]
Trenin, D. 2014. The Ukraine Crisis and the Resumption of Great Power Rivalry.
[118]
Tsygankov, A. 2015. Vladimir Putin’s last stand: the sources of Russia’s Ukraine policy. Post-Soviet Affairs. 31, 4 (Jul. 2015), 279–303. DOI:https://doi.org/10.1080/1060586X.2015.1005903.
[119]
Tsygankov, A. 2005. Vladimir Putin’s Vision of Russia as a Normal Great Power. Post-Soviet Affairs. 21, 2 (Jan. 2005), 132–158.
[120]
Tsygankov, Andrei P.1 2012. Assessing Cultural and Regime-Based Explanations of Russia’s Foreign Policy. ‘Authoritarian at Heart and Expansionist by Habit’? Europe-Asia Studies. 64, 4 (2012), 695–713.
[121]
Tsygankov, A.P. 2012. Russia and the West from Alexander to Putin: honor in international relations. Cambridge University Press.
[122]
Tsygankov, A.P. 2012. Russia and the West from Alexander to Putin: honor in international relations. Cambridge University Press.
[123]
Tsygankov, A.P. 2012. Russia and the West from Alexander to Putin: honor in international relations. Cambridge University Press.
[124]
Tsygankov, A.P. 2012. Russia and the West from Alexander to Putin: honor in international relations. Cambridge University Press.
[125]
Tsygankov, A.P. 2012. Russia and the West from Alexander to Putin: honor in international relations. Cambridge University Press.
[126]
V. N., V. 1996. Vek Ekateriny II: proryv na Balkany. Novaia i noveishaia istoriia. 4 (1996).
[127]
Van Evera, S. 1999. Causes of war: power and the roots of conflict. Cornell University Press.
[128]
Von Laue, T.H. 1981. Stalin among the Moral and Political Imperatives, or How to Judge Stalin? The Soviet and Post-Soviet Review. 8, 1 (Jan. 1981), 1–17. DOI:https://doi.org/10.1163/187633281X00010.
[129]
Vsesoi︠u︡znoe obshchestvo ‘Znanie.’ et al. 1955. International affairs. (1955).
[130]
Wallander, C.A. 2007. Russian Transimperialism and Its Implications. The Washington Quarterly. 30, 2 (2007), 107–122.
[131]
William C. Wohlforth 1995. Realism and the End of the Cold War. International Security. 19, 3 (1995), 91–129.
[132]
William C. Wohlforth 2009. Unipolarity, Status Competition, and Great Power War. World Politics. 61, 1 (2009), 28–57.
[133]
Wohlforth, W.C. 2001. The Russian-Soviet empire: a test of neorealism. Review of International Studies. 27, 05 (Dec. 2001). DOI:https://doi.org/10.1017/S0260210501008099.
[134]
Wohlforth, W.C. 2009. Unipolarity, Status Competition, and Great Power War. World Politics. 61, 01 (Jan. 2009). DOI:https://doi.org/10.1017/S0043887109000021.
[135]
Wolf, R. 2011. Respect and disrespect in international politics: the significance of status recognition. International Theory. 3, 01 (Mar. 2011), 105–142. DOI:https://doi.org/10.1017/S1752971910000308.
[136]
Zubok, Vladislav M. 2007. Failed Empire : The Soviet Union in the Cold War from Stalin to Gorbachev. University of North Carolina Press.
[137]
Zubok, Vladislav M. 2007. Failed Empire : The Soviet Union in the Cold War from Stalin to Gorbachev. University of North Carolina Press.
[138]
Zubok, V.M. and Pleshakov, K. 1997. Inside the Kremlin’s cold war: from Stalin to Khrushchev. Harvard University Press.
[139]
Chapter 4: Russian Imperialism and Military Power in the Eighteenth Century: Why and How. Strategy and Power in Russia 1600-1914.
[140]
Cold War History. 7, Special Issue: Ideas, International Relations and the End of the Cold War.
[141]
Faulty Powers, Moscow’s Choice. By: McFaul, Michael, Foreign Affairs, 00157120, Nov/Dec2014, Vol. 93, Issue 6.
[142]
2014. Russia’s Latest Land Grab: How Putin Won Crimea and Lost Ukraine. Foreign Affairs. 93, 3 (2014).
[143]
What the Kremlin Is Thinking. By: Lukin, Alexander, Foreign Affairs, 00157120, Jul/Aug2014, Vol. 93, Issue 4.
[144]
Why the Ukraine Crisis Is the West’s Fault. By: Mearsheimer, John J., Foreign Affairs, 00157120, Sep/Oct2014, Vol. 93, Issue 5.
