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Mao Y. When Zhou En Lai met Gamal Abdal Nasser: Sino-Egyptian Relations and the Bandung Conference. In: Bandung 1955: Little Histories. Monash University
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French D. Nasty not nice: British counter-insurgency doctrine and practice, 1945–1967. Small Wars & Insurgencies 2012;23:744–61. doi:10.1080/09592318.2012.709763
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CH TRHLO. The effect of Prime Minister Anthony Eden’s illness on his decision-making during the Suez crisis. QJM: An International Journal of Medicine 2005;98:387–402. doi:10.1093/qjmed/hci071
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Bowie RR. Eisenhower, Dulles and the Suez Crisis. In: Suez 1956: the crisis and its consequences. Oxford: : Clarendon 1989.
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Parmentier G. The British Press in the Suez Crisis*. The Historical Journal 1980;23. doi:10.1017/S0018246X00024365
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Galpern SG. Money, oil, and empire in the Middle East: sterling and postwar imperialism, 1944-1971. Cambridge: : Cambridge University Press 2009.
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Denver D, Garnett M. The Popularity of British Prime Ministers. The British Journal of Politics and International Relations 2012;14:57–73. doi:10.1111/j.1467-856X.2011.00466.x